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1. Introduction
Separation of Powers is one of the basic structural principles of 
democratic societies. It was already discussed by ancient philosophers, 
deep analysis can be found in medieval political and philosophical sci­
entific work, and we base our contemporary discussion on legal theory 
that has been developed in parallel to the emergence of democratic sys­
tems in Northern America and in Europe in the 18th Century.
Separation of Powers is not an end in itself, nor is it a simple tool 
for legal theorists or political scientists. It is a basic principle in every 
democratic society that serves other purposes such as freedom, legal­
ity of state acts — and independence of certain organs which exercise 
power delegated to them by a specific constitutional rule.
When we look back to 20 years of a new Constitution and democ­
racy in Russia it is worth to focus on this core principle of modem con­
stitutionalism and combine it with an essential guarantor of the demo­
cratic constitutionals state: Constitutional Justice. The independence of 
constitutional courts is an objective of the separation of powers, inde­
pendence is its result. This is one aspect, and perhaps the aspect which 
first occurs to most of us.
Another perspective deals with the reverse relationship: indepen­
dence of constitutional courts as a precondition for the separation of 
powers. Independence enables constitutional courts to effectively con­
trol the respect for the separation of powers.
Being a scientist and constitutional Judge in Austria, the country 
with the longest tradition of modem constitutional justice, I would like 
to contribute to the anniversaiy conference by adding some thoughts 
on the relevance of Constitutional Justice and in particular its indepen­
dence for modem constitutional systems.
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2. Two preliminary remarks on the scope of the topic
Before I begin my analysis, I should make two preliminaiy remarks 
which are necessary for a proper discussion of the topic. The first 
remark deals with the definition of what is a constitutional court. The 
second remark is directed at the differences in the constitutional system 
in which a constitutional court develops its case law.
a) Constitutional Courts in Europe
When I talk about constitutional Courts I refer to the «European 
type» of constitutional courts. I make reference to the historical roots 
of constitutional justice in the Europe of the 20th Century. After the 
establishment of a Constitutional Court in Austria, in 1920, which 
did not exist between 1934 and 1945 and of the Constitutional Court 
of Czechoslovakia in 1920, which never became effective, European 
States have established Constitutional Courts in two waves after 1945 
and after 1989. In 1989 a Constitutional Supervision Committee was 
created in Russia. It was dissolved towards the end of 1991 and the 
Russian Constitutional Court was established. All these courts have a 
number of common features, which distinguish them from other sys­
tems, which can be called the «American type» of constitutional justice, 
as they follow the model of the American Supreme Court.
For today’s topic, there are fundamental differences in the func­
tions with a view to the Constitution, which have to be mentioned in 
order to get an accurate answer to the question of the separation of 
powers. The European type constitutional courts are judicial organs 
that were entrusted with ensuring normative superiority of the constitu­
tion over the remainder of the legal order. Fundamental rights form an 
integral part of the legal body of constitutional law. In many European 
systems, individuals are entitled to file applications in order to enforce 
their rights. At the same time, international human rights were made 
effective. They have been increasingly influencing the domestic prac­
tice over the last six decades.
According to the constitutional thinking of the Austrian legal theo­
rist Hans Kelsen, the ordinary (criminal, civil or administrative) judge 
had no power at all to decide on the conformity of a law with the con­
stitution. The task of defending the integrity of the hierarchy of norms 
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is in the exclusive competence of the constitutional court. This is called 
the «monopoly to annul laws» («Normverwerfimgsmonopol»). On the 
other hand, constitutional courts are limited to deciding constitutional 
disputes and constitutional questions in disputes involving various 
questions.
b) « Younger» and «older» democracies
It is common ground among all constitutional experts as politi­
cians, who bear responsibility in government, that the social contexts in 
which a particular constitutional court has been instituted and continues 
to operate, may vary to a large extent.
A rough division into two groups of constitutional courts takes 
account of this context: Courts in young democracies and courts in 
democracies with a longer democratic tradition. In this second group, 
we find a commitment to functional separation of powers, a certain con­
stitutional culture and especially a high convergence of constitutional 
law and constitutional practice.
An overview shows that competences of constitutional courts vary 
considerably. We still find that a number of courts have a limited scope 
of jurisdiction. In the long run, a limited scope of the constitutional court 
will hinder it from becoming an effective guarantor of the supremacy of 
the constitution. The ex post-control of the conformity of laws with the 
constitution together with the power to set aside laws found unconsti­
tutional may be seen as a key factor for effective constitutional justice.
Another point is decisive: the access of the individual to the consti­
tutional court. This right has proven to be the most important ingredient 
for successful constitutional justice; examples of young democracies 
show this, as do established democracies such as Austria or Germany, 
which have demonstrated it in particular in the second half of the 20th 
Century.
3. Separation of Powers — a valid concept in today’s constitu­
tional theory
Modem legal theory takes due account of what John Locke has 
formulated in Book II of «Two treatises on Government» and Montes­
quieu has established in «De l'Esprit des Lois» («The Spirit of Laws»). 
However, the ideal of checks and balances and of three equivalent
powers had to be adjusted in view of the developments that occurred 
during the 20th Century.
Separation has always been more than drawing borders, it was the 
distribution of powers and it was the intertwining or joining of powers.
When we talk about the separation of powers, it is also clear that it 
comprises functional, institutional and personal separation. The degree 
and the quality of separation of powers in a particular constitutional 
system can only be measured if one assesses the extent to which func­
tional separation corresponds to institutional separation, i.e. whether 
different functions are fulfilled by different institutions and persons that 
are not directly dependent on organs of other institutions.
In modem constitutionalism, there is a tendency to consider the 
complexity of inter-organ-relations within one state power. This ten­
dency takes due account of the contribution of the distribution of com­
petences (powers) within a certain state power to the overall quality of 
the separation of powers. Such a contribution exists for instance if, in 
a system of a two chamber parliament, both chambers have the right to 
elect a certain number of constitutional judges.
Above all, it was the judicial power that has given rise to much dis­
cussion within the separation of powers doctrine. It was held, by Mon­
tesquieu and others, that the judiciary had no limiting function vis-ä-vis 
the legislator. This is true, as far as the ordinary judge is concerned, 
who is strictly bound by law and who is not empowered to decide on 
the constitutionality of laws. However, this is not true for the American 
type supreme courts and for the constitutional courts to the extent that 
they can effectively limit the power of legislation to the boundaries of 
the constitution.
The separation of powers does not, however, create the indepen­
dence of courts in general and of the constitutional court in particu­
lar. The material requirement of independence is not replaced by an 
abstract principle. Its function is limited to assisting the material guar­
antee of independence. We can see this relationship more clearly, if we 
imagine the following: if there were mixed powers of legislation and 
executive and both were under the effective control of an independent 
constitutional court, we would find the power of government limited,
although there was no classical separation of powers in the triadic sense 
of Montesquieu.
4. Independence of Constitutional Courts and the Legislature
As constitutional courts are empowered to set aside laws and stat­
utes, legal theory describes them as «negative legislators». Legal theory 
has done so since the early 20th Century. However, this is only one 
aspect of the influence of constitutional courts on the legislative power: 
the constitutional judge is inevitably and on a permanent basis close 
to the powers of the legislator in a «positive» sense as well. Let me 
enumerate three features of a possible positive interference of constitu­
tional courts with the legislative power.
a) «Interpretation in conformity with the constitution»: in many 
systems, constitutional courts have a certain discretion when they make 
a decision during norm control proceedings concerning the constitu­
tionality of a legal rule on whether to annul the law or to interpret it 
in a way that makes it conform to the constitution. While at first sight 
they preserve the integrity of the law, it is not always an act of judicial 
self-restraint. Especially in cases where the legislature has obviously 
intended a solution which the constitutional court found unconstitu­
tional, the court substitutes the original meaning with a new one, it is 
materially «amending» the law. In cases where the legislator could have 
chosen another solution that was also in line with the constitution and 
taking into account the fact that the majority in parliament would have 
opted for a different solution, the approach may limit the legislature de 
facto in its range of action.
b) Guidelines for new legislation: Sometimes constitutional courts 
do not restrict themselves to just saying what is absolutely necessary 
in giving the grounds for the annulment of a law. In fact, they go on in 
their reasoning and present to the parties of the proceedings and above 
all to the legislature, guidelines for future legislation. In systems, where 
the constitutional court is commonly accepted by all political parties 
and has gained high authority, such guidelines may have a considerable 
impact on the legislative process following the annulment of a legal 
rule.
с) Constitutional courts supplementing Parliament: there may be 
situations where legislation was necessary according to the constitution 
or simply for practical reasons, but there was no consensus in Parlia­
ment for a solution. Under such circumstances, it is possible for one of 
the conflicting parties to submit a more or less political question to the 
constitutional court, which is often willing to decide that question by 
means of constitutional law.
Constitutional courts regularly come close to the boundary between 
judicial power and legislative power — which is neither a straight nor a 
clear one. And there may be situations in a constitutional system where 
a constitutional court steps over this line without being accused of abus­
ing its power.
If we are aware of that matter, we are also conscious of the legis­
lature’s political discretion; it enjoys a «margin of appreciation» espe­
cially in complex situations involving technical questions of any kind 
where the ex ante view of the legislature is necessarily different from 
the ex post view of the constitutional judge. Constitutional courts will 
also take into account the strong material democratic legitimacy of a 
decision of a parliament, which the court will not replace with its own 
assessment in situations of political discretion.
The extent of the judicial self-restraint will vary from country to 
country and from one field of legislation to another. Nevertheless, there 
are common lines in a comparative perspective, common lines that are 
drawn by international courts, especially regional courts such as the 
European Court of Human Rights or the Interamerican Court of Human 
Rights. These courts have set standards in the past with respect to many 
human rights guarantees and they have defined areas where the member 
states enjoy a larger margin of appreciation and situations where there 
must be a stricter control by the international judge. It may well be held 
that this theory of «margin of appreciation» has some impact also on the 
separation of powers in the internal constitutional system.
It is not a coincidence that the question of margin of apprecia­
tion — and with that a special feature of the separation of power — 
has appeared in the field of human rights. Decisions on human rights’ 
questions often entail defining public and private interests, balancing 
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these interests and making a choice of preference for one or the other. 
In a number of cases, human rights decisions reflect a social change, 
answers given by the legislature and ultimately by the constitutional 
court reviewing the legislation are in a certain sense «political answers».
The famous phrase «Constitution is what the constitutional court 
says it is» seems to describe the reality in some of the countries where 
the constitutional courts enjoy a strong position. From a theoretical 
separation of powers’ perspective, however, this is not a fully adequate 
description of the separation of powers: Parliament remains in charge. 
It can change the constitution when it is of the opinion that the con­
stitutional court has interpreted the constitution in a way that was not 
intended. In other words: with respect to constitutional law, it is not the 
constitutional court but Parliament that has the «last word», although 
the requirement of a two-thirds majority will usually — if the Govern­
ment does not have such a majority in Parliament — not lead to a reac­
tion by the legislature.
The more powerful reaction to the case-law of a court may be exer­
cised by nominating judges that are closer to politics. The effect and 
the possibilities in this respect depend largely on the national rules on 
nominating judges. There is a wide range of requirements, procedures 
and other criteria in different countries. From a general perspective, 
professional requirements, long terms of office and a fixed age-limit, 
the division of rights to present candidates among various state organs 
and qualified majorities in election proceedings will reduce the pos­
sibilities of influencing the composition of a constitutional court as a 
reaction to certain case law. The Russian system is a good example for 
this practice. Judges are nominated by the President and appointed by 
the Federation Council of Russia. In order to become a judge of the 
Constitutional Court, a person must be a citizen of Russia, at least 40 
years of age, have legal education, have served as a lawyer for at least 
15 years and have «recognised high qualification» in law.
A developed constitutional culture will provide additional safe­
guards against any discretionary reaction by Government or Parlia­
ment. In Russia, fully in line with international standards, no judge of 
the Constitutional Court may be a member of the Federation Council,
a deputy of the State Duma, other representative bodies, hold or retain 
other public or social office or engage in entrepreneurial activities apart 
from teaching, academic or other creative activity. A Russian constitu­
tional judge may not belong to political parties and movements.
This leads me to my final point in this part of my speech. The con­
stitutional judge who respects the separation of powers between leg­
islation and the judicial control of legislation will take due account of 
the margin of appreciation, of political questions and of the democratic 
legitimacy of decisions of Parliament. In turn, it may expect the unlim­
ited respect of parliament for its own decisions, which aim to enforce 
the supremacy of the constitution over legislation and the executive.
5. Independence and Separation of Powers — General condi­
tions of an effective constitutional control in transitional systems
The situation is of course different in transitional societies, where 
this respect must sometimes still be attained. Here, we need conditions 
that cannot be created by the constitutional courts; they can only con­
tribute to a step-by-step development of the legal system and the soci­
etal environment. They have to be a role model for other constitutional 
organs in using the legal method when interpreting the constitution, 
strict obedience of rules of conduct, take account of international stan­
dards and thereby give support to the individuals when they are seeking 
the protection of their fundamental rights. A number of constitutions 
of transitional systems might still need some clarification in defining 
the powers of the state and their relationship to each other. Above all, 
discrepancies between the texts of the constitutions and constitutional 
reality must be reduced, and constitutional culture must break ground 
in all spheres of exercising state powers.
Today, constitutions and constitutional courts in transitional sys­
tems have much less time to develop and reach certain standards in 
comparison to the time institutions had in the 19th and 20th Centuries. 
However, from an international and a comparative perspective, today 
we find a rich experience of how to implement constitutional judicial 
review in situations of transition. Let me take up a few observations of 
possibilities and risks constitutional courts face in transitional systems: 
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* First, if we look at older systems, we can see that the current 
standard was not reached in an instance. A number of steps needed to be 
taken, sometimes in difficult situations. The step-by-step-approach has 
proven to be the best way to improve judicial standards.
* A second point is the role of human rights today, both on an inter­
national and on a national level. We find a body of case law of regional 
human rights courts, practice of UN institutions and case law of national 
constitutional courts that is exchanged between the courts on a bilateral 
and on a multilateral basis. Learning from the experience of others and 
learning from each other’s contributions to the quality of constitutional 
justice all over the world and in many fields of constitutional law, above 
all in the field of human rights, has become a decisive factor of success.
* Third, it seems that constitutional courts have to gain faith, trust 
and self-confidence over a certain period of time. Trust by society and 
legal experts is gained by a predictable practice, case law with a clear 
methodological basis, where former decisions are quoted to show a 
consistent «line».
* It is one of the most important tasks of constitutional courts to 
develop values behind the provisions of the constitution. In doing so, 
the constitutional court also has the possibility of establishing the con­
sensus in a young democracy, which might not have existed when the 
State was founded.
* Judicial courts that have a procedural law where the court was 
a neutral arbitrator between parties have proven to be successful. For 
this reason, adversarial proceedings tend to strengthen independence. 
In such a system, the constitutional judge is not a public prosecutor in 
charge of defending the constitution, he or she should be the neutral 
guardian. Against this background, the competence to institute proceed­
ings ex officio has to be seen with scepticism.
* A court that is not in the position to work efficiently will not be an 
effective guardian of the supremacy of the constitution. It is therefore 
a danger when a constitutional court is confronted with an enormous 
workload from the very beginning, producing a backlog of cases that 
increases from year to year.
* In traditional systems, the role of international courts cannot be 
estimated high enough. International and regional courts strengthen 
internal independence, especially in systems of transition. Where there 
is still a lack of internal consensus, the authority of a long existing inter­
national institution accepted by the large majority of states concerned 
will help to stabilise the system in general and the constitutional court 
in particular.
6. Three factors contributing to the independence of constitu­
tional courts
Let me return to the general perspective and put my topic in the 
following question: what factors may — if they work or are used in a 
positive manner — strengthen independence of constitutional courts in 
modem democratic societies governed by the rule of law or in condi­
tions of societal transformation?
Three factors seem to be of particular importance: ethical standards 
for and of constitutional judges, a constitutional culture of respect for 
constitutional justice, a well-balanced role of the mass media, the pro­
tection of individual rights and international co-operation between con­
stitutional courts.
a) Ethical standards o f judges
In countries where the constitutional court is an effective organ, 
it follows from the competencies of the court that it deals with ques­
tions of a «political» nature. Human rights, disputes on competencies 
of the highest organs under a constitution, the annulment of a govern­
ment decision or the annulment of a law very often entail «political» 
questions. It is therefore not excluded that the single judge or the court 
as a whole comes under political pressure in certain circumstances. 
Sometimes the legislative rules on the court reflect this danger and they 
address this danger with specific and concrete safeguards. Sometimes 
they do not. It would not be appropriate to draw conclusions from the 
extent of legal regulation about the quality of independence of constitu­
tional courts for the following reasons.
The extent to which independence of constitutional courts is 
respected by Government and Parliament highly depends on the politi­
cal and constitutional culture of a given state. Very detailed regulations 
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may not be worth much where there are subtle mechanisms of influenc­
ing judges or where pressure is actually exercised on them. Rather vague 
rules may be sufficient where the court and its judges are respected as 
ultimate guarantors of the constitutions.
b) Constitutional Culture
Having said this, I must add that constitutional culture is not a thing 
which exists without an alternative and which cannot be influenced. 
Admittedly, the starting point for one constitutional court may be more 
difficult than that of another, taking into account the history of a state 
and the history of its constitution. However, in eveiy situation it is in 
the hands of Government, civil society including above all the media 
and not forgetting the judges themselves, to enhance the respect for 
the constitutional court and thereby also its independence. On the other 
hand, even under «mature» democracies, where the constitutional court 
has reached a strong position, confidence and independence may be in 
danger and may be hampered by Government, the media or the judges 
themselves.
Let me identify two factors of culture I chose out of many others.
Election process: Most constitutions have more or less similar 
criteria for the election of constitutional judges, a working group will 
produce a report showing common grounds as well as differences. One 
feature shared by quite a number of constitutions is the existence of 
clear criteria for the qualifications and rules that anticipate that a single 
political party may not decide on the composition of the courts. This 
procedure produces plurality in the court, and plurality is an important 
factor, if not a legal precondition for the independence of constitutional 
courts. On this basis, transparency in electing constitutional judges and 
choosing women and men that have gained respect in their former pro­
fessional life, irrespective of their political beliefs, enhances the inde­
pendence of courts. Self-restraint of the political class in electing new 
judges that have spent most of their former professional life in politics 
is also important.
c) The Role o f the media
The media have a role that should not be underestimated. In modem 
society, the publication of decisions in official collections of judgments
or in law journals is still important; but it is not decisive for the overall 
perception of the performance of a court. Long before these publica­
tions appear, there is a public debate in the media on the content of deci­
sions, its reasoning and its consequences. In this situation, the media 
bear responsibility for the proper perception of court decisions, and it 
is a common feature in democratic societies that the media strengthen 
and support the independence of constitutional courts by giving them a 
voice in the public debate.
Having said this, I turn to the dangers of the relationship between 
the courts and the media and to the duties of the constitutional court. 
The courts must be aware that their decisions may be perceived dif­
ferently in a general political debate than in the circles of specialised 
(constitutional) lawyers. That means that a judge drafting a decision 
must bear in mind that it will be read by non-lawyers while keeping 
the standards of legal reasoning. Sometimes, a «translation» of a judg­
ment for the public may be required — for instance by means of press 
releases. The European Court of Human Rights gives us an example of 
good practice in informing the European public and the public of the 
Member State concerned. Beyond this task of «translation», the Court 
and its judges should refrain from «interpreting» the judgments. In any 
event, it shows that there is a fine line between informing and translat­
ing a judgment, on the one hand and interpreting or even commenting 
it, on the other hand.
7. Conclusion
Ladies and Gentlemen! Let me conclude:
20 years have passed quickly. In a few years time the Berlin wall — 
being a symbol for the Iron curtain that divided Europe for some three 
decades — will be tom down for a longer period than it had actually 
existed. This simple comparison is the basis for my final remark: If we 
look 20 years ahead we will hopefully have reached a point where it is 
not appropriate to make any difference between so called «new» and 
«old» democracies. We should than share a common European heritage 
of constitutional culture, including separation of powers and a fully 
independent Constitutional justice in all European States.
